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The Instructional Information Processing Account of 
Digital Computation* 
Abstract. What is nontrivial digital computation? It is the processing of discrete data through discrete 
state transitions in accordance with finite instructional information. The motivation for our account is 
that many previous attempts to answer this question are inadequate, and also that this account accords 
with the common intuition that digital computation is a type of information processing. We use the 
notion of reachability in a graph to defend this characterization in memory-based systems and 
underscore the importance of instructional information for digital computation. We argue that our 
account evaluates positively against adequacy criteria for accounts of computation. 
1. Introduction 
What is computation? At first blush, this question may seem trivial and uninteresting. 
The Turing machine (TM) is a widely accepted model of digital computation that is 
often used to ascertain whether a specific physical phenomenon is computational1. 
Finite computation in a TM is defined as a fixed mapping from inputs to 
corresponding outputs. The TM is used for defining computability, universality and 
computational complexity. Why then should we bother with this question? 
The problem of characterizing computation is far from being trivial. To 
complicate matters we commonly find claims such as:  
● “[Natural] cognition is a type of computation” (Pylyshyn 1984, xiii). 
● “Every ordinary open system is a realization of every abstract finite 
automaton” (Putnam 1988, 121). 
● “[T]he universe computes” (Lloyd 2006, 3). 
But what does it mean to assert that cognition, every ordinary open system or the 
universe computes? Besides, if everything computes, then what computation means 
does not seem to matter.  
                                                        
* This is a preprint of the article appearing in Synthese. It is reproduced with the kind permission of 
Springer-Verlag. The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-
013-0338-5.  
1 The subtle distinction between x being computable and x being computational is not further discussed 
here. 
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The TM model is insufficient for ascertaining whether some systems are 
computational. A finite state automaton (FSA) differs from the TM, since its input 
tape is not bidirectional, infinite or writable. Yet, the FSA is regularly used to solve 
computational problems. Even the modern digital computer does not have anything 
that corresponds to the TM’s infinite tape. Furthermore, newer computational models 
such as quantum computers, relativistic computers, hypercomputers, connectionist 
networks, evolutionary computers and molecular computers are not necessarily 
compatible with the standard TM model. Do they all perform the same type of 
computation? If not, do they have something in common or are they completely 
distinct? 
Even in the realm of computational cognitive science, it is far from clear what 
computation means. Very few accounts provide plausible explanations of this 
phenomenon. We highlight two plausible accounts in Section 5. Some inadequate 
accounts, which are motivated by finding a bridge between computation and 
mentality, presuppose that computational states are individuated in the same way that 
mental states are. However, this presupposition faces problems (removed-for-
anonymity-1 2013). The present account does not share this presupposition. 
To highlight additional problems inadequate accounts face, we briefly consider 
the physical symbol systems (PSS) account and the formal symbol manipulation 
(FSM) account. On the PSS account, a computational system is a physical symbol 
system that contains sets of interpretable and combinable symbols and a set of 
processes that operate on symbolic expressions by generating, copying, modifying, 
combining and destroying them according to instructions (Newell and Simon 1976, 
116). On the FSM account, a computational system is a physical automatic formal 
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system, the states of which are identified as symbols, that manipulates symbols 
according to its own rules (Haugeland 1985, 76). 
The FSM and PSS accounts are problematic in many respects. Lack of space 
permits only two brief remarks. First, both these accounts are grounded in symbolic 
computation and promote external semantics as the center of digital computation. “A 
computational process is one whose behavior is viewed as depending on the 
representational or semantic content of its states” (Pylyshyn 1984, 74). Second, 
despite their similarities they are extensionally different accounts, because they 
denote different classes of computational systems. The class of computational systems 
denoted by the PSS account only includes programmable stored-program universal 
computers. The FSM account classifies a broader range of computational systems, 
including for example, specific-purpose TMs. Both accounts exclude physical 
implementations of FSAs, flip-flops 2  and discrete connectionist networks. The 
resulting classes are too narrow, as they exclude too many paradigmatic digital 
computational systems (removed-for-anonymity-1 forthcoming-a). 
It is generally assumed that digital computation can be freely defined as 
information processing. However, the truth of the claim that digital computation is 
information processing can only be ascertained once the precise notion of information 
is fixed. In removed-for-anonymity-1 (2012) and Piccinini and Scarantino (2011) 
various notions of information are examined as the basis for understanding 
computation as information processing. In this paper, we propose “instructional 
information”3 as the correct notion that gives rise to the instructional information 
processing (IIP) account of computation. According to our account, nontrivial digital 
                                                        
2 Flip-flops are basic memory cells. A flip-flop is a bistable element with a clock input. Its state 
changes only in response to a clock edge, say, when the clock signal rises from 0 to 1 (Harris and 
Harris 2013, 108). 
3 This notion is defined and explicated in the next section. 
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computation is the processing of discrete data through discrete4 state transitions in 
accordance with finite instructional information. Unlike other accounts of 
computation that are either too narrow or too broad, the IIP account has the right 
scope. It classifies CPUs, TMs, conventional digital computers, flip-flops and FSAs 
as nontrivial computational systems, whilst classifying chairs, digestive systems and 
walls as non-computational. Since it also does not posit the individuation of 
computational states in the same way that mental states are individuated, it is a 
plausible basis for a computational theory of cognition.5 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the notions of data, semantic 
content and instructional information are defined and analyzed. In Section 3, we use 
the technique of reachability in a graph to motivate the IIP account by analyzing 
memory-based nontrivial computational systems. In Section 4, we explicate the IIP 
account by analyzing both memory-based and memoryless computation. In Section 5, 
we claim that the IIP account is adequate and improves on two plausible accounts of 
digital computation: the algorithm execution account and the mechanistic account. In 
Section 6, we show a positive evaluation of the IIP account against adequacy criteria 
for accounts of computation. Section 7 concludes the discussion and identifies 
directions for future work. 
2. Instructional Information - Definitions and Preliminaries 
Let us begin with two basic definitions of data and semantic information that are 




4 In this paper the property of being discrete - or digital - implies having sharp and distinct boundaries. 
5 The evaluation of this last claim remains a task for further work. 
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Definition 1. A datum d is the lack of uniformity between at least two uninterpreted 
variables that are distinct from one another in a domain that is left open to further 
interpretation (Floridi 2011, 85). 
 
Definition 2. An object O is an instance of semantic information, understood as 
semantic content, iff:  
1 It consists of n data D (n ∈ N+). 
2 D are well formed. 
3 D are meaningful independently of their recipient (Floridi 2010, 21). 
 
Semantic content requires fixing the conventions of the communication in some 
way so that data have the meaning we want them to have. Both well-formedness and 
meaningfulness appeal to something outside pure data (be that abstract or physical). 
The first requirement of Definition 2 is of positive data and is self-explanatory. The 
second requirement is that the data be structured according to some rules. A common 
conception of rules is the syntax rules for a language. Data can also be structured via 
physical characteristics of the system, such as the grouping of nucleotides to form 
codons in DNA. The first two requirements give rise to the simplest form of 
information: structured data. The addition of the third requirement yields semantic 
content. It only requires that structured data comply with the semantics of the system 
or code in question. 
For the present analysis, we adopt Luciano Floridi’s data based definition of 
semantic content. Floridi’s theory of strongly semantic information that is founded on 
the above definitions (2011, chap. 5) is undoubtedly not problem-free. One of its key 
problems is the tenet that the underlying data have to be veridical for semantic 
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content to qualify as genuine semantic information (i.e., factual information) (cf. 
Fetzer 2004; Scarantino and Piccinini 2010). It might even be argued that there are 
other well-developed theories of entropy that seem more adequate for the analysis of 
the interaction between information and computation, such as Gibbs entropy, 
Shannon information and algorithmic information (Adriaans 2010, 44–45). However, 
elsewhere, the first author has argued that, at least, Shannon information and 
algorithmic information are not up to the task of explaining digital computation, for 
they lack the conceptual richness to capture the notion of instructional information 
(removed-for-anonymity-1 2012). These two conceptions are insensitive to the 
meaningfulness of data. It is certainly possible that the central definition of 
instructional information may be reformulated using Gibbs entropy, Shannon 
information or algorithmic information. However, it remains to be seen how such 
reformulation can be accomplished. 
Another concern is that it may appear that our formulation of the IIP account 
yields a circular definition of computation, due to the second requirement of 
Definition 2. In computer science well-formedness is often defined by using a notion 
of computation that appeals to an automaton accepting a class of strings.6 If that were 
always the case, then our account of computation would itself depend on a notion of 
computation. 7  However, examination of two common forms of computation 
demonstrates that well-formedness is generated by the organization of the system. 
We consider both an abstract and a physical computational system. First, the well-
formedness of the data in the TM is determined by the definition of TMs. The input 
data are restricted to certain forms in tape cells according to certain rules. The well-
                                                        
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for identifying this potential conundrum. 
7 Incidentally, in passing it should be noted that, at least prima facie, using algorithmic information as 
an alternative to semantic content in our context inevitably yields a circular definition of computation. 
For algorithmic information is defined in terms of computational programs.    
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formedness in this case emerges from the positioning of the individual datum in the 
proper place on the tape. Given their abstract nature, each datum approaches Floridi’s 
notion of data de re (2011, 85 ff). Second, the structure of data in a conventional 
digital computer comes from the physical organization of the system. Wires and flip-
flops are organized in a particular order. It is that organization of the physical carriers 
of electrical signals as data de signo (Floridi 2011, 86) that structures the data. In both 
of these cases, and others, the structure of the data may be obtained from the 
organization of the system concerned, rather than through some computational 
requirement. This also shows that being structured is not an inherent ontological 
quality of data. 
Semantic content can give rise to factual information (Floridi 2011, 103ff) and to 
instructional information. By Floridi’s lights, for semantic content to qualify as 
factual information it also has to be veridical. However, instructional information 
cannot be qualified as true or false, for it is intended to make something happen. In 
this sense, it escapes the problems faced by factual information. The correctness and 
lack of ambiguity of the semantic content8, rather than its veridicality, contribute to 
yielding the right state of affairs when instructional information is processed. The 
three requirements of semantic content are necessary conditions for instructional 
information, but they need to be supplemented by a sufficient condition.9 This gap is 
filled by the following definition. 
 
                                                        
8 If the semantic content is incorrect, by following it reliably the expected outcome is unlikely to be 
obtained. If it is correct but ambiguous, it is impossible to follow reliably, for there are at least two 
courses of possible action. 
9 Strictly, Floridi considers another type of instructional information that is based on what he calls 
“environmental information”. Environmental information is conveyed by data that might be 
meaningful independently of an intelligent producer (Floridi 2010, 32). This type of information is 
distinguished from semantic content. In this paper, we confine our discussion to instructional 
information as a subtype of semantic content. We make another observation regarding environmental 
information below in the context of analyzing Boolean gates. 
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Definition 3. Semantic content is an instance of instructional information iff its 
satisfaction yields a definitive action in a given context. 
 
Instructional information is prescriptive rather than descriptive. The debate over 
the nature of imperatives, the core of instructional information, is unsettled. 
Definition 3 accords with other classifications of imperatives. “An imperative [...] 
expresses an immediate demand for action but that does not describe a fact: an 
imperative is satisfied if we have the result of an agent’s action” (Ross 1941, 54). 
“[T]he kernel [...] of the imperative [is] the action [...] that the imperative enjoins” 
(Hamblin 1987, 45). “[I]mperatives convey requirements [...] for action or 
prescriptions of actions” (Pérez-Ramírez and Fox 2003, 55). Adopting Charles 
Hamblin’s Action State Semantics model whereby a world is a series of states 
connected by events10, allows the identification of those worlds in which a given 
imperative is satisfied in some set of states (Reed and Norman 2007, 417). The 
imperative “Close the window!” is satisfied in those worlds in which the window is 
closed given the right conditions. There exists a triple relation Pre→[α]Post, where 
“Pre” are pre-conditions and “Post” are post-conditions, that establishes the 
correctness of the action (α) performed. Action α is correct if it is possible to perform 
it when the pre-conditions are satisfied with respect to the state concerned (Pérez-
Ramírez and Fox 2003, 45, 59). 
It is worth noting that instructional information can also be expressed either 
negatively or positively. In English, for example, the construction of a negative 
imperative typically differs from the positive one by the presence of some negative 
quantifier, e.g., “Don’t close the window!”. This type of construction is found in some 
                                                        
10 Events are of two types: deeds, performed by specific agents, and happenings, which are world 
effects (Reed and Norman 2007, 417). 
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natural languages, but constitutes a minority overall (cf. Miestamo and Auwera 2007). 
In a general form, a negative imperative can be expressed as <prohibitive, 
prohibition> (Kaufmann 2012, 9). Importantly, for our present purposes, a prohibitive 
still yields a definitive action and is occasionally used in computational systems. NOP 
or NOOP, shorthand for no operation, instructs the computational system to do 
nothing. It is found in assembly language, high-level programming languages (e.g., an 
empty block statement “{}” in C or the pass statement in Python) and computer 
protocol commands. It is often used to synchronize operations. 
Thus characterized, instructional information cannot rise to the level of factual 
information. An instruction, regardless of whether it is actualized as the satisfaction of 
semantic content in the right context, is neither true nor false. Also, instructional 
information need not necessarily be utilized. A washing machine user manual that 
specifies the order in which to set the dials contains instructional information even in 
the absence of an agent with the capacity to do so. This is a case of an unfulfilled 
instruction, rather than inaccurate or false description.  
An important implication of Definition 3 for the IIP account is the necessity of a 
system having the capacity to carry out the action. A capacity is an inherent action 
that a system, either abstract or physical, can reliably and predictably execute. A 
system (or an agent) processes instructional information when, in general, it has at 
least two capacities.  
Instructional information is conveyed either conditionally or unconditionally. We 
briefly examine how instructional information is used conditionally and 
unconditionally in computer programming. Consider the following simple code 




sumOfValues = 0 
for number in inputList: 
sumOfValues += number 
     return float(sumOfValues) / len(inputList) 
else: 
return 
Code excerpt 1. Computer code that calculates the average of the integer values of an input 
list.  
  
How is instructional information conveyed by the statements above? 
● “if inputList” - If the condition is true, “inputList” is not empty, the statements 
that follow it are executed.  Whereas, “else” represents the alternative path. 
● “for number in inputList” - This for statement iterates over the elements in the 
list “inputList”. The imperative character of this instruction is enabled by the 
inherent conditional that evaluates positively if there is at least one more 
element in the list. 
● “sumOfValues += number” - This incremental assignment statement is an 
unconditional imperative that adds the value of the current element of 
“inputList” to the variable “sumOfValues”.  
We note that function calls, such as “len(inputList)”, are equally describable as 
instructional information. In general, any function call is an imperative, since it 
directs the assignment of arguments to parameters and the execution of a specific 
body of code.  
By way of concluding this section, we introduce three abbreviations for ease of 
exposition in the ensuing discussion. “Data” can denote unstructured data, structured 
data or semantic content. 
● Let D stand for discrete data simpliciter in the broadest form. Any instance of 
D simply complies with Definition 1. 
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● Let ud stand for unstructured discrete data. Any instance of ud is an instance 
of D that satisfies only the first requirement of Definition 2 (i.e., being 
nonempty data). 
● Let sd stand for structured discrete data. Any instance of sd is an instance of D 
that satisfies at least the first two requirements of Definition 2 (i.e., being 
nonempty and well-formed data). 
The sets of all possible ud and sd are disjoint and their union is the total set of D. 
3. Nontrivial Computational Systems and Reachability in a 
Graph 
In this section, we develop a theoretical structure that helps in answering our main 
question, “What is computation?”. In particular, we analyze paradigmatic abstract 
computational systems and identify instructional information as an essential 
component of any notion of nontrivial computation. To proceed, we review some 
work by Pieter Adriaans and Peter van Emde Boas in which they develop the notion 
of meta-computational space for TMs (2011). Following that we turn our focus to 
memory models and adapt their notion to establish the concept of a generalized meta-
computational space for analyzing all memory-based nontrivial computational 
systems. We include a very simple example to help concretize these concepts. 
There are three views of TMs as computational systems that are helpful here: a 
specific TM computing on some specific input, a specific TM (not confined to a 
specific input), and the simultaneous consideration of all possible TMs. The most 
straightforward is the case of a specific TM computing on some specific input.  
Adriaans and van Emde Boas define an Instantaneous Description (ID) to include a 
description of the entire tape contents, the position of the tape symbol currently being 
scanned and the current state of the TM (the reader is referred to (Adriaans and van 
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Emde Boas 2011) for complete details). For our purposes, an ID describes a specific 
memory configuration of a particular TM. Adriaans and van Emde Boas also define 
the notion of a configuration graph. In this graph, every possible ID for a particular 
TM is mapped to a vertex of the graph and a directed edge is added to the graph from 
vertex with IDi to the vertex with IDj iff the configuration specified by IDj follows 
from IDi via a single move (i.e., a capacity) of the TM. A valid computation of the 
TM corresponds to a path between any two such vertices in the corresponding 
configuration graph. A path that starts at ID0, the unique ID representing the starting 
configuration of the TM, and continues through the graph to any vertex that contains 
an ID with the halt state corresponds to an accepting computation of the TM. The last 
notion adopted from Adriaans and van Emde Boas is that of a meta-computational 
space, which is the disjunct sum of all the configuration graphs for a given 
enumeration of TMs. 
Next we make two adaptations to these concepts. As defined, the notion of meta-
computational space applies only to TMs. Since our aim is analyzing systems for any 
memory model, we use the notion meta-computational space to refer to the disjunct 
sum of all of the configuration graphs for a given enumeration of systems over a fixed 
memory model. Our second adaptation stems from the observation that in a meta-
computational space, there is nothing that guarantees that all edges are present. In 
fact, in the case of TMs, it is quite clear that many edges are not present due to the 
definitional restriction on TMs that requires the read/write head to move at most one 
tape cell in a single move. Thus, the meta-computational space generated by a given 
enumeration of TMs is not as general as possible. We use generalized meta-




Definition 4. A generalized meta-computational space for a given meta-
computational space is the complete directed graph, including self-loops, on the 
vertex set of the meta-computational space. 
 
Generalized meta-computational spaces are graphs based upon the memory model 
present in the system under consideration. We use the term reachability graph (RG) 
to refer to any subgraph of a generalized meta-computational space. Each RG is a 
possibly infinite graph where each vertex represents a specific memory configuration 
of the system, and an edge represents a capacity of that system to move from one 
memory configuration to another. For the simple example shown in fig. 1, we have a 
system with a 2-bit memory model 11 . Thus, there are four possible memory 
configurations and hence, vertices in the RG. In the generalized meta-computational 
space there are no restrictions on the edges. That is, the system has the capacity to 
move from any one configuration of the two bits to any other. 
 
Figure 1. Generalized meta-computational space for 2-bit memory system. 
 
                                                        
11 It should be noted that a generalized meta-computational space with a richer memory model can be 
used to model any system with a simpler. For example, the generalized meta-computational space 
associated with TMs can be used to model the systems shown in fig. 1 and fig. 2. The advantage gained 
by considering different generalized meta-computational spaces is a clearer taxonomy of computational 
systems as is shown in Section 6. 
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Note that every computational system on two bits is a subgraph of this RG. The 
example illustrated in fig. 2, representing a 2-bit shift left register, is based on the 
same memory model, but as a computational system has a restricted set of capacities. 
 
Figure 2. The meta-computational space for a 2-bit shift left register. 
 
The notion of generalized meta-computational space removes the restrictions 
imposed by a specific computational system and gives a clearer picture of 
computation in memory-based systems. We argue that memory-based nontrivial 
computation, construed as the processing of data through discrete state transitions 
according to instructional information, is defined completely in terms of reachability 
in a generalized meta-computational space. Thus, instructional information provides 
the basis for understanding computation. 
Our approach, then, begins by fixing a memory model that in turn yields a 
generalized meta-computational space. At this point, it is possible to structure a 
variety of different computational systems and classes of computational systems over 
the generalized meta-computational space by placing restrictions on the capacities of 
systems. In the case of the class of all TMs, restrictions include things such as the 
read/write head can move at most one cell to either the left or the right, the input is in 
the lowest numbered cells and so on. These restrictions on capacities, in turn, place 
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restrictions on edges in the RG. For example, the read/write head restriction implies 
that there can only be an edge between two vertices when the integers representing 
the head locations differ by either zero or one. Implicit in the definition of a TM is the 
requirement that the position of the head be ignored in the application of a move. In 
turn, this forces a single move of a specific TM to appear as infinitely many edges in 
an RG, even when the RG is a configuration graph.  
Defining computational systems in this way, we have a uniform approach in which 
the memory model is identified, restrictions on capacities are specified, and edges, 
representing capacities, are included in the RG12. A computation in the RG begins at 
any vertex and ends at any other vertex. A system, abstract or physical, that supports 
the underlying memory model and has the requisite capacities, implements that 
computation by processing the specific instructional information that actualizes those 
very same capacities. 
An obvious shortcoming of the RG approach thus described is its lack of 
applicability to memoryless systems. However, it is clear that instructional 
information plays a key role in memory-based computation. To address this 
shortcoming, our focus changes in the next section to explicate the IIP account, 
analyze memoryless systems and discuss nontrivial computation at greater length. 
4. Fleshing Out the IIP Account 
In the previous section, we have developed an abstract notion of memory-based 
nontrivial computation. This description clearly delineates capacities within a system 
from the instructions whose satisfaction yields the activation of those capacities. In 
this section, we extend the use of the capacity/instruction distinction to motivate the 
                                                        
12 This approach allows for descriptions of capacities to potentially be infinite. While infinite 
descriptions may not be particularly useful, they do not impact the finiteness requirement of 
instructional information. 
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IIP account in physical systems and explain both memory-based and memoryless 
computation in a uniform way. 
According to the IIP account, nontrivial computation is the processing of discrete 
data through discrete state transitions in accordance with finite instructional 
information. Trivial computational systems process D, which need not be structured, 
by way of exercising the single capacity of the system. Nontrivial computational 
systems, on the other hand, process instructional information by way of being capable 
of processing at least two distinct instructions for the corresponding capacities. 
The instructions processed are either conditional or unconditional relative to the 
particular chosen level of abstraction13 (LoA). In computer science, abstraction is the 
process of identifying objects, properties and interrelationships that arguably hold the 
essence of the computational system considered (van Leeuwen forthcoming).  Some 
nontrivial computational systems clearly process conditional instructions. Conditional 
statements are common in programming languages (cf. code excerpt 1) and so a 
computer that executes a program typically also processes conditional instructions. 
Other nontrivial computational systems, such as certain flip-flops, only process 
unconditional instructions to exercise their capacities. Analysis of computational 
systems on the IIP account also requires consideration of the system’s memory model. 
We separately consider computational systems that are memory-based and 
memoryless. 
                                                        
13 Floridi defines an LoA as an object of study (e.g., a system) that consists of a finite, non-empty set 
of observables, which are interpreted typed variables (2011, 52). A typed variable is a variable 
qualified to hold only some declared kind of data. In this context, ‘interpreted’ means that the typed 
variable represents some feature of the system under consideration. Note that an analysis that relies on 
the data being structured should proceed using moderated LoAs. For more on LoAs see Floridi (2011, 
chap. 3). In the context of computational objects, higher and lower LoAs interrelate. The interpretation 
of an LoA in terms of the lower LoA remains of utmost importance and the interface among LoAs is 
also crucial (van Leeuwen forthcoming). See (van Leeuwen forthcoming) for a discussion of the 
differences between the usage of LoAs in computer science and the method described by Floridi. 
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In memory-based nontrivial computational systems, the memory model accounts 
for which unconditional instruction is to be executed next. The execution of a 
conditional typically requires a change from one memory configuration to another in 
the RG (or back to itself via a self-loop). A computational system has the capacity to 
perform certain operations conditionally. Unconditional instructions, and possibly 
other D, trigger the execution of conditional capacities.14 The condition p→q is 
merely shorthand for ¬p q. The truth tables for both statements are equivalent, but 
only the former explicitly represents a conditional. In other words, whether the 
instruction to be processed is conditional or unconditional in relative to a particular 
LoA. This also shows how specific organizations of trivial computational systems, 
that is, primitive Boolean gates, give rise to nontrivial computational systems. 
For all genuine computational systems what matters to their data processing is the 
abstract form (i.e., type) of the processed D rather than the particular realization of the 
D (i.e., token data). The same transformation of D may take place in a variety of 
physical substrates (cf. a flip-flop implemented using rebounding water droplet 
collisions in Mertaniemi et al. 2012). This is the root of the multiple realizability of 
algorithms and data. An algorithm may be implemented in different programming 
languages and on different physical architectures. Multiple realizability of D is 
reflected both in Definition 1 - the matter of the implementation of D is left 
undetermined and in the articulation of RGs in that the nature of the instruction that 
activates a particular capacity is quite naturally left unspecified. 
                                                        
14 It can also be argued that, in some sense, every imperative can be expressed as a conditional. For 
example, “do X” can be expressed as “do X unless there is some exceptional circumstance”. The 
“exceptional circumstance” serves as a sanction imposed on the normal course of action. Still, this is 
the modus operandi of physical computational systems. The system computes as long as there is no 
failure. 
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This brings us to the relationship between abstract computation and the physical 
system that implements it. Any abstract computation (performed by, say, a TM, an 
FSA or a cellular automaton) is reducible to atomic operations over individual pieces 
of data, which can, but need not, be symbols. In accordance with Definition 1, data 
can be either abstract or physical. In a TM, data are implemented as symbols on its 
tape and as states of the finite control and head positions. These data may in turn be 
implemented as magnetic polarity changes (or as patterns of physical pits on a platter) 
and as electrical voltages, respectively, in a conventional digital computer. Below we 
give examples of physical computational systems in which ud and sd are physically 
realized.  
On our account, the delineations between computational systems and non-
computational systems, and between trivial and nontrivial computational systems 
depend on the input D, the processing of D, the output D and whether the systems in 
question have memory. Memory-based computational systems are grouped as classes 
of systems based on a shared memory model and capacities. However, memoryless 
computational systems are analyzed on the basis of whether and how they structure 
data. A NOT-gate, which has only one capacity, does not have the same capacity as 
any two-input, one-output Boolean gate. Each of the next two sections focuses on a 
particular class of computational systems. 
4.1. Non-Computation and Computation in Memoryless Systems 
Our first distinction is between computational and non-computational systems. If for 
any input D the system does not always produce the same output D (i.e., different 
inputs potentially cause different outputs), the system computes. For example, the 
input ud an AND-gate receives affects the output ud the AND-gate sends. Only (1,1) 
as input causes a logical 1 as output. Thus, the AND-gate computes, for it does not 
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always produce the same output. Conversely, if a system always produces the same 
output D irrespective of the received input D, then that system does not compute. We 
return to non-computational systems later. 
The next distinction to be drawn is among memoryless computational systems. 
This class consists of two subclasses: all memoryless trivial computational systems 
and all memoryless nontrivial computational systems. The subclass of memoryless 
trivial computational systems in turn consists of two further subclasses: those systems 
operating on ud as input and those systems operating on sd as input. 
 
Figure 3. The class of memoryless trivial computational systems is the union of two disjoint subclasses: 
those operating on ud and those operating on sd. 
 
Memoryless trivial computational systems (see fig. 3) include physical systems 
such as two-input, one-output Boolean gates, the NOT-gate, half adders, full adders, 
and n-bit adders. There are similar abstract computational systems, such as logical 
conjunction and the three place Boolean function that produces both the sum and 
carry of adding those three bits. The NOT-gate and most two-input, one-output 
Boolean gates15 belong to the subclass of systems operating on ud. Swapping the 
                                                        
15 There are four two-input, one-output Boolean functions that operate on sd, including the function 
defined by the following four 3-tuples: (0,0,0); (0,1,0); (1,0,1); (1,1,0). The first two bits are the inputs 
and the last one is the output bit. The inputs (0,1) and (1,0) clearly show that the order of D matters (in 
contrast to, say, an OR-gate). 
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order of the input lines of, say, an AND-gate does not change its output: both (0,1) 
and (1,0) lead to the same output.  
We consider two different perspectives on the AND-gate. In the first, the inputs are 
treated as ud, that is, neither bit plays any special role in the function computed. The 
output is determined by the gate’s physical capacity that follows the rules of the 
logical conjunction operation. Note that viewed from this perspective, there is no 
notion of an instruction, since the inputs are unstructured. It is also clear that there is 
no need for an instruction as the system has precisely one capacity. This system 
performs its single capacity whenever ud are present as input. Alternatively, the input 
can be viewed as sd, with one bit identified as the control bit carrying instructional 
information. The capacity of the AND-gate can be expressed as: if the control bit is a 
1, the datum bit is the result; otherwise 0 is the result. 
Why is the first perspective of the AND-gate more appropriate for the explanation 
of its operation? In the AND-gate there is no functional distinction between the datum 
input bit and the control bit. It does not matter whether the first one is treated as a 
datum or as an instruction. Attributing one bit the role of D and the other the role of 
control can be done arbitrarily ex post facto. In general, structure may be attributed to 
any ud. This is due to the structure of data not being an inherent ontological quality of 
data. Yet here, promoting ud to sd is done arbitrarily.  
The observation that the AND-gate and similar Boolean gates process ud and not 
sd has two important implications. The first implication is related to Floridi’s 
classification of some instructional information as environmental information (cf. fn. 
9). He argues that “the logic gates in the motherboard of a computer merely channel 
the electric voltage, […interpretable] in terms of instructional information […] such 
as ‘if . . . then’. In this case, there is no semantics involved at the level of the gates”. 
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Here, our present analysis diverges from Floridi’s in that Boolean gates are not 
viewed as processing instructional information. They have a single capacity. This also 
brings us to the second implication. Even if an AND-gate processes semantic content, 
that semantic content would not satisfy Definition 3. For the operation of an AND-
gate cannot be reasonably described as following an imperative. “[T]he characteristic 
purpose of imperatives is to influence choice. It is futile to tell [...] anyone to do 
something [...] he cannot help doing” (Hamblin 1987, 145). The AND-gate simply 
does what it “should” by design thereby exercising its only capacity in the presence of 
ud. “[A] forced action is not really an action; […] the agent complies [...] with some 
persuasive force” (Hamblin 1987, 146, italics added). 
A full adder is more complex in design than an AND-gate. This circuit has three 
inputs and two outputs and a single capacity. While the standard description of a full 
adder suggests that the three inputs are structured, a simple analysis of the behavior of 
the full adder indicates that they are not. Since the three input bits are ud, a full adder 
ought to be categorized similarly to the AND-gate. 
An n-bit adder belongs to the subclass of memoryless trivial computational 
systems operating on sd. Its input is structured: the zeroth bits are separate from the 
first bits and so on. It is, therefore, more computationally powerful than, say, two-
input, one-output Boolean gates, yet, it only performs trivial computation. It has only 
a single capacity. No instructional information is needed for its operation.  
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Figure 4. The class of all memoryless computational systems is the union of two disjoint subclasses: 
those processing instructional information (nontrivial & memoryless) and those that do not (trivial). 
 
Multiplexers16 and multi-operation ALUs17 are examples of memoryless nontrivial 
computational systems (see fig. 4). Systems in this subclass not only operate on sd as 
input, but also process instructional information. Consider an ALU with two (or 
more) capacities, say, addition and subtraction. Because it has more than one capacity 
for possible action, it requires a control bit. There is a functional distinction between 
the operands and the control bit. Therefore, the order of the bits in the operands 
matters to the operation of the ALU. Note, however, that this ALU is memoryless. 
While the ALU receives input sd, it performs either an addition or subtraction and 
continues to do so until it receives different input sd or is powered off. A similar 
analysis applies in the cases of other memoryless nontrivial computational systems 
                                                        
16 A multiplexer is a combinational circuit that is used to choose an output among several possible 
inputs sd based on a value of a select signal (Harris and Harris 2013, 83). 
17 An arithmetic logical unit (ALU) is an essential component of most CPUs. It combines a variety of 
arithmetic and logical operations, such as addition, subtraction, conjunction and disjunction, into a 
single unit (Harris and Harris 2013, 248). 
23 
that structure data, including systems such as a three-input, one-output multiplexer 
(Harris and Harris 2013, 83). 
In sum, the dividing line between trivial and nontrivial computational systems is 
drawn by the processing of instructional information (see fig. 5). Trivial 
computational systems do not process instructional information, since they have only 
one capacity. The processing of D, that need not be structured, is done through a 
single action of the system by either the transformation from one type of D to another 
(e.g., a NOT-gate) or the modification of D (e.g., a XOR-gate). Nontrivial 
computational systems have at least two distinct capacities and are controlled by 
instructional information. 
 
Figure 5. The class of all computational systems is the union of two disjoint subclasses: trivial and 
nontrivial computational systems. Only systems in the latter subclass process instructional information. 
 
4.2. Nontrivial Computation in Memory-Based Systems 
The principle of exercising control at the heart of the IIP account is already 
manifested by multiplexers and multi-operation ALUs, and is even more conspicuous 
in memory-based nontrivial computational systems, such as TMs (discussed in 
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Section 3), FSAs, flip-flops and conventional digital computers. In general, for 
memory-based computational systems, the memory model implies a structure to the D 
it holds. At each step of a TM computation, the combination of the symbol read from 
the tape (i.e., sd) and the state of a deterministic TM uniquely determines the capacity 
to be exercised next. This combination is, therefore, instructional information, which 
when processed actualizes a capacity of a TM to move from the current memory 
configuration to another. 
The FSA is another example of an abstract memory-based nontrivial computational 
system. For it uses the underlying memory model of TMs and has the requisite 
capacities for implementing computations by processing the specific instructional 
information that actualizes those very same capacities. The main differences from the 
TM come from the restricted set of capacities (and thus, the simpler RGs) that FSAs 
are allowed. The contents of the FSA’s input tape remains unchanged, and the 
position of the read-only head shifts only to the right by exactly one position. The key 
point is that transitions of the FSA represent capacities the FSA has to move from one 
memory configuration to another by processing instructional information. Since the 
set of edges allowed in the RG for FSA is much smaller than the set of allowable 
edges for TMs and the former can neither store nor delete arbitrary sd during its 
operation, the former is less computationally powerful than the latter by the IIP 
account.  
 The flip-flop is an example of a physical system related to the class of FSAs. The 
generalized meta-computational space for a system with two Data flip-flops is the one 
shown in fig. 1. There are four possible inputs (00, 01, 10, 11). Each of those is 
instructional information with each meaning transition to the indicated state. When 
the system processes any of the four instructions it actualizes its capacity to move 
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from one memory configuration to another, thus processing sd through discrete state 
transitions in accordance with finite instructional information. 
4.3. Replies to Two Possible Objections 
We consider two possible objections to our account. The first objection concerns the 
case of systems computing the identity function. In Section 4.1 we characterize a 
computational system as one in which different inputs potentially cause different 
outputs. An apparent contradiction arises when a system S that computes the identity 
function takes D as input and returns the same D as output. 
Our reply addresses three different systems computing the identity function. 
Simple mechanisms, such as delay gates, do not perform trivial computation. A delay 
gate is analogous to a wire carrying a binary signal (electricity at one voltage or 
another) where the same input D is simply produced as output D unchanged. The 
emphasis is on the output being a simple “copy” of unchanged D. The second case 
concerns a combinational circuit consisting of primitive Boolean gates organized in 
such a way as to compute the identity function. One might argue that this is 
problematic, since this combinational circuit, which should count as a memoryless 
trivial computational system, does not compute. But this claim is misguided. For any 
construction of such a circuit requires that the primitive Boolean gates process the 
input D thereby transforming it before the overall output yielded is the same as the 
input. The third case is resisting a similar claim that a TM that computes the identity 
function is supposedly not computational. In this case the RG specification of this TM 
shows that whist the same input sd is produced as output, the TM produces the output 
by moving from one memory configuration to another. 
The second objection considered is to our characterization of systems that always 
produce the same output D irrespective of the input D as non-computational. Consider 
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a TM that “ignores” its input sd or erases whatever input sd there is on the tape, sums 
the numbers 1-9, writes 45 on the tape as output and halts. This TM “always” 
produces 45 as output irrespective of the input. This shows, the objection continues, 
that, on our account the TM does not compute, since for any input D it always 
produces the same output D (i.e., 45). This concern is addressed by again considering 
the RG of the TM. The erasure of a single input symbol represents a change in the 
memory configuration. An instruction is required to actualize that capacity, thereby 
meeting our characterization of computation. 
5. An Improvement on Two Plausible Accounts 
We now compare the IIP account with two plausible accounts of computation and 
show how our account resembles them, and more importantly how it improves on 
them. The IIP account resembles an account of digital computation in terms of 
algorithm execution. Whilst, informally, an algorithm is an ordered sequence of 
instructions to solve a particular problem, a more rigorous definition is problematic. A 
sequential-time algorithm, for example, can be defined as a state transition system 
that starts in an initial state and transitions from one state to the next until, if ever, it 
halts or breaks. However, there are other types of algorithms that may not be similarly 
defined, such as asynchronous parallel, distributed, real-time, hybrid and even 
quantum algorithms (Gurevich 2012). This problem leads to the key advantage of the 
IIP account over an explanation of computation in terms of algorithm execution. 
For the sake of comparison, let us consider the algorithm execution account 
proposed by Jack Copeland (1996). According to this account, a system S computes a 
function F iff there exists a labeling scheme L and a formal specification of an 
architecture (e.g., 2.7GHz quad-core Intel Core i5) and an algorithm specific to the 
architecture (e.g., a mergesort algorithm written in machine language) that takes 
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arguments of F as inputs and delivers values of F as outputs such that the pair (S, L) is 
an honest model of that specification (Copeland 1996, 348)18. Our focus is limited to 
the executed algorithm and the executing architecture. 
Copeland defines an algorithm as a “finite set of instructions such that, for some 
computing machine M, each instruction calls for one or more of M’s primitive 
operations to be performed, either unconditionally or if certain conditions [...] are 
met” (1997, 696). An algorithm ϕ being specific to an architecture ϴ implies not only 
that a ϴ-type machine can run ϕ, but also that each instruction in ϕ calls explicitly 
for the execution of some sequence of the primitive operations available in ϴ. If ϕ 
called for multiplication on an ϴ-type machine that does not support multiplication as 
a primitive operation, it would only be executed correctly provided that each 
multiplication instruction in ϕ is replaced by, say, a series of addition instructions 
(Copeland 1996, 337).  
 However, Copeland’s description is consistent with the notion of a program rather 
than an algorithm. This leads to the undesirable consequence of computation being 
the execution of programs, rather than algorithms. Consider any algorithm for adding 
two positive n-digit numbers, such as the one that children learn in primary school. 
Such an algorithm can be implemented in arbitrarily many ways using a specific 
programming language and then compiled for a particular machine (converting the 
algorithm into a program). No data types are imposed by the algorithm nor are any 
limitations imposed by ϴ. However, on Copeland’s account, an algorithm is specific 
to ϴ and that makes it a program. 
On this account, computation amounts to program execution, but what about 
computational systems that do not execute a program? Arguably, discrete 
                                                        
18 The reader is referred to (Copeland 1996) for complete details. 
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connectionist networks do not execute programs. Yet, we contend that, on the IIP 
account, these networks may be classified as computational systems. Recurrent 
networks change their persistent state(s) in the course of computation and thereby 
qualify as memory-based systems, whereas feedforward networks do not. Only some 
feedforward networks operate on sd and require instructional information to single out 
a particular capacity to be exercised; those qualify as nontrivial computational 
systems. It also seems a stretch to describe a flip-flop as executing a program, in 
accordance with Copeland’s account. On the IIP account, on the other hand, the flip-
flop is classified as computational. Importantly, if cognition (or at least part of it) is 
indeed computational, but not in virtue of program execution, then the IIP account is 
advantageous as a plausible basis for a computational theory of cognition. 
We now turn to compare the IIP account and the mechanistic account, showing 
how the former is an improvement over the latter. On the mechanistic account, digital 
computation is the processing of strings of digits according to rules (Piccinini 2007a). 
A “digit” is defined as a macroscopic state of a component of a computational system 
(Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 7). 
We focus our analysis on the mechanistic “digit”. On the mechanistic account, a 
large number of possible microscopic states correspond to each macroscopic state-
type (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 7–8). On the IIP account, microscopic states, 
such as [4V-5V] and [7V-8V], are viewed as D (e.g., representing 0 and 1 bits on the 
input lines of an OR-gate). It may be argued that digits are D, but Gualtiero Piccinini 
maintains that many computations “depend not only on an input string of data, but 
also on the internal state of the […] mechanism” (2007a, 509). Data are distinguished 
from states. He also argues that memory components in digital computers have the 
dual function of storing macroscopic states and indicating the memory state upon 
29 
request. “Their state constitutes either data strings or the physical implementation of 
abstract internal state” (Piccinini 2007a, 514, italics added). 
The mechanistic “rule” also highlights this distinction. “A rule [...] is simply a map 
from input strings of digits, plus possibly internal states, to output strings of digits” 
(Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 8). This suggests that digital computation proceeds 
from input D and possibly the internal states of the computational system to output D. 
We conclude that mechanistic digits qualify as D. On the IIP account, internal states 
of computational systems constitute sd at the appropriate LoA. For example, the 
internal state of the TM’s controller and the input datum – that is, the scanned symbol 
– play an equal role in determining the next move of the TM and together they qualify 
as sd.  
To what type of information do mechanistic digits rise? They are not just ud as can 
be inferred from Piccinini’s emphasis on the ordering of digits (Piccinini 2007a, 515). 
Since the ordering of digits matters, they are sd. Piccinini argues elsewhere that digits 
“need not carry Shannon information at all [... and] strictly speaking, computing 
systems need not process Shannon information” (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011, 27). 
He also argues that digital computation need not be the processing of nonnatural (i.e., 
semantic) information, which is descriptive and representational. So, digits need not 
carry nonnatural information (or be representations) (ibid, 30). 
Do some digits qualify as instructional information? If digits are sd and the IIP 
account is correct, it seems that the answer must be affirmative. This is where the 
mechanistic “rule” comes into play. Since some digits act as input sd and others are 
output sd, it makes sense that some digits encode the rules for processing input sd. 
“Both data and instructions are physically instantiated as strings of digits, which 
computers can manipulate” (Scarantino and Piccinini 2010, 326). Furthermore, 
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Piccinini argues that “information” as employed in computer science is “non-truth-
evaluable” in a manner that corresponds with “instructional information”. 
Accordingly, the same string of digits may play the role of either an instruction or 
data at different times (Scarantino and Piccinini 2010, 325–326). 
The IIP account employs a richer notion of data thereby allowing an explanation of 
significantly more computational properties. Consider only those components of a 
digital computer that require power to retain any D. They provide the memory model 
for the system. Since for any given computer these components are finite in number, 
they give rise to a finite number of different possible memory configurations in the 
RG. The particular computer has certain capacities and as computation progresses the 
computer uses instructional information to transition from one memory configuration 
to another. This view of digital computers is found in a meta-computational space 
generated over an enumeration of all FSAs.  
Here the advantage of the IIP account is most apparent. On the mechanistic 
account, FSAs are “so much less [computationally] powerful than ordinary digital 
computers” (Piccinini 2007a, 506). However, if computers are basically large 
complicated FSAs, the mechanistic account may not be effective at separating 
complexity due to size (as is the case between FSAs and computers) from complexity 
due to a particularly rich structure (as is the case between FSAs and TMs). The IIP 
account does better here. As another example, we noted above that the right 
combination of a NOT-gate and an OR-gate gives rise to a circuit with the capacity 
enabling conditional instructions (cf. the first objection discussed in Section 4.3).  In 
contrast, primitive Boolean gates are trivial computational systems each with a single 
capacity. Thus, we have a separation that is due to increasing complexity. We 
conclude that the IIP account generalizes and improves on the mechanistic account. 
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6. The IIP Account Evaluated 
In this section we evaluate the adequacy of the IIP account. For simplicity, we adopt 
Piccinini’s criteria (2007a) for this evaluation, since they are self-explanatory and 
justifiable. 
According to the first criterion, objectivity, whether a system is computational has 
to be determined as a matter of fact. Unlike some authors who claim that 
computational descriptions are vacuous (Putnam 1988; Searle 1990), we maintain that 
computation is objectively identifiable relative to the appropriate LoA. Memory-
based nontrivial computation is defined completely in terms of memory models, 
capacities and reachability. Either the criteria for reachability are met or not. Any 
adversary’s enthusiastic attempt to describe some arbitrary transitions of microscopic 
states of some wall as nontrivial computation is faced with a challenge. If she claims 
the wall to be a memoryless computational system, she has to show which 
microscopic states are treated as input sd, what their structure is, what capacities the 
wall has and by virtue of what instructional information they are actualized when 
processed. If she claims the wall to be a memory-based computational system, she 
also has to show what properties of the wall are used to define the IDs and edges of 
the RG. 
It may be objected that a conventional AND-gate, for example, could be just as 
well described differently as an OR-gate when the standard interpretations of logical 0 
and logical 1 are reversed (Shagrir 2001, 374). This supposedly shows that the 
computational identity of the system is observer-relative. But it does not follow that 
computation is observer-relative. Certainly, the underlying data processing capacity of 
the AND-gate, for example, can be used in different ways, such as logical conjunction 
or disjunction, giving rise to “different” computations relative to different LoAs. But, 
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as suggested before, an analysis of computational systems in terms of the lower LoA 
is of utmost importance (cf. fn. 13). 
The point is that a semantic reinterpretation of the AND-gate’s operation as logical 
disjunction at a higher LoA does not undermine the system being computational. The 
information processing operation analyzed at the lower LoA is simply given another 
name relative to some higher LoA. Logical disjunction may very well be called 
conjunction instead, but it is still a computation. The “black box” does not change, 
and the transformation of D it performs remains unchanged. The only change is how 
the input and output D are interpreted. Besides, systematic reinterpretations are 
relatively simple for trivial computations. But, more complex computations are harder 
to systematically reinterpret as a different computation. The observer-relativity of 
computation is discussed at length elsewhere (removed-for-anonymity-1 
unpublished). 
According to the second criterion, the right things compute, both abstract and 
physical paradigmatic computational systems have to be classified as computational. 
As shown above, abstract systems, including TMs and FSAs, are nontrivial 
computational systems. So are multi-operation ALUs, multiplexers, flip-flops, CPUs 
and conventional digital computers. Whilst primitive Boolean gates as well as some 
combinational circuits (e.g., half- and full-adders and n-bit adders) are classified as 
computational, they only perform trivial computations on our account.  
According to the third criterion, the wrong things do not compute, paradigmatic 
non-computational systems are classified as non-computational. Planetary systems, 
digestive systems and walls do not perform computations on the IIP account. Planets 
move along ellipses where they revolve around a larger object (a star) in accordance 
with Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. But that does not amount to them processing 
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instructional information. Any computational description applied to their planetary 
motion may only be applied ex post facto. It is perhaps unsurprising that non-
computational systems may only be described computationally ex post facto. Just as 
describing some physical object O by a system of equations does not imply that O is a 
system of equations, describing O computationally does not imply that O is 
computational (Piccinini 2007b, 99). Even if the processes of O are computable, it 
does not follow that they are computational. The question is what gives such a 
computational description explanatory force.  
The explanatory force of this description is provided by the underlying 
assumptions of this description. Even if we assumed that the elliptical movement of 
some planet is the execution of an imperative instruction (whatever the instruction 
and the input sd operated on are), to qualify as a nontrivial computation there needs to 
be another distinct path the planet could move along that is a second capacity. At best, 
a planetary motion may be described as a trivial computation. Consider the second 
perspective offered in Section 4.1 on the operation of Boolean gates and the ascription 
of structure to the input D processed by an AND-gate. Removing this complication 
yields a simpler description. Occam’s razor demands this as the more appropriate 
description. 
According to the fourth criterion, miscomputation, physical computational systems 
may fail to compute in the presence of noise. For memory-based systems, 
miscomputation is explained by the IIP account through the notion of paths in RGs. 
Making a transition from one vertex to another in the absence of an edge is a 
miscomputation. When sd are mapped into physical states and physical computation 
takes place on those physical states miscomputation may occur. It occurs when some 
noise causes a physical system to transition from a physical state si to another state sj 
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and F-1(si) is either undefined or F-1(sj) does not follow F-1(si) at the abstract level of 
processing instructional information (where the function F maps sd to the physical 
state realizing them). For example, if some noise causes a flip-flop to enter an 
undefined state, the flip-flop miscomputes. In memoryless computational systems, a 
miscomputation occurs when a particular capacity is actualized where it would not 
have otherwise been actualized in the absence of noise. 
The possibility of miscomputation reveals the elusive aspect of purposefulness in 
both trivial and nontrivial computational systems. An artificial computational system 
may be said to act for a purpose according to its design. When it fails to accomplish 
the purpose for which it was designed, a miscomputation can be identified (removed-
for-anonymity-1 forthcoming-b). An important distinction for analyzing 
purposefulness is between internal and external teleology. Objects that have some 
immanent property that makes them goal-directed can be said to be internally 
teleological. If an object has some goal assigned to it by some goal-conceiving agent, 
then it is externally teleological (Mahner and Bunge 1997, 368). Accordingly, an 
artificial computational system can have an externally assigned purpose, which is, 
arguably, key for identifying the function(s) it computes. A natural computational 
system, on the other hand, can only plausibly have a purpose for the system itself, that 
is, it is internally teleological.  
Yet, the claim that purposefulness is necessary for classifying a system as 
computational is problematic. Consider a computer-illiterate monkey that is provided 
with components, such as transistors and diodes, that are needed for building two-
input, one-output Boolean gates. Suppose that the monkey accidentally ends up 
constructing an OR-gate (ORmon) that is a physical duplicate of an OR-gate 
purposefully constructed by an engineer (OReng). Since OReng was constructed 
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purposefully, it may be classified as computational. Yet, ORmon, which was not 
constructed according to some purposeful design, cannot be classified as 
computational. This leads to an absurd consequence where only one of the two OR-
gates may qualify as being computational, despite them being physical duplicates. A 
detailed analysis of purposefulness must await another forum. But suffice it to say that 
the appeal to purpose in determining what function is being computed by a given 
system is epistemological, insofar that it is enforced by our explanatory goals, rather 
than metaphysical in nature (Matthews 2011). 
According to the fifth criterion, computational taxonomy, different classes of 
computational systems have different capacities. Our taxonomy assumes the truth of 
the Church-Turing Thesis, which states that every effectively computable function is 
computable by a TM. A general-purpose TM can simulate any specific-purpose TM, 
thereby being able to compute any partially recursive (Turing-computable) function. 
Extant formalisms of computability (e.g., Kleene’s formal systems model, Gödel’s 
recursive functions model, Church’s lambda calculus and Post’s machines) are all 
Turing-equivalent. Whether this extensional equivalence suffices for computation 
simpliciter remains contentious (removed-for-anonymity-1 2013). Any problem that 
cannot be solved by a TM, given the Church-Turing thesis, presents a limit to what 
can be accomplished by any form of machine that works in accordance with effective 
methods. It remains an open empirical question whether there are in fact deterministic 
physical processes that cannot be simulated by a TM (Copeland 2004, 15). 
Computational complexity is accounted for in two ways, the richness of the 
memory model and the richness of the capacities for actualizing instructional 
information. We have shown above how memoryless trivial computational systems, 
which need not actualize instructional information, gain more computational power 
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when their input D are structured. The next step up in computational complexity is 
memoryless nontrivial computation. Systems in that category lack memory but have 
more than one capacity (enabled by the corresponding imperative instructions) and 
process instructional information.  
The next step up is memory-based nontrivial computation. Even though the FSA 
and TM can be built on the same memory model, an FSA has more restrictions on 
capacities than a TM, therefore, the latter is more computationally powerful than the 
former. It is worth emphasizing that it is not simply the number of internal states that 
determines the computational power of a TM. A general-purpose TM using just seven 
states and four symbols can simulate any specific-purpose TM, even if the latter has 
more states (Neary and Woods 2012). The RG of a general-purpose TM is much 
richer than the RG of the specific-purpose TM that it is simulating. This example 
demonstrates that computational systems with richer capacity sets (edges in the RG) 
are computationally more powerful for the same underlying memory model.   
7. Conclusion 
Before concluding we make a few conjectures regarding the applicability of the IIP 
account to other information processing systems. The most plausible conjecture is that 
some discrete connectionist networks qualify as nontrivial computational systems, 
whilst others qualify as trivial computational systems. As observed above, some 
connectionist networks change their persistent state(s) during the course of 
computation and others do not. Moreover, some networks that have only a single 
capacity, say, to perform a linear summation of n neural inputs, do not need to process 
instructional information. We discuss this at length elsewhere (removed-for-
anonymity unpublished). 
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A second less obvious conjecture is the possible applicability of some version of 
the IIP account to biological information processing systems. Many biologists hold 
that the causal role of genes should be understood in terms of their carrying 
information about their various products. Genes carry a message that is supposed to 
be expressed even if that message is not actually expressed (Godfrey-Smith 2008). 
Genes and only genes code the amino acid sequences of protein molecules. This 
informational property is only applicable to the amino acid sequence (Godfrey-Smith 
and Sterelny 2008). If genes carry messages that have imperative, rather than 
descriptive, contents, then “instructional information” seems applicable. However, we 
note that, at the very least, unlike the case of digital computation, the input and output 
D differ in their nature. The outputs are amino acids, which are the building blocks of 
protein molecules, whilst the input is the raw material in the cell. A thorough analysis 
of the memory model of genes will facilitate the application of the IIP account to 
biological systems. 
The last conjecture, which certainly seems the most contentious one, is the possible 
applicability of (a modified version of) the IIP account to natural cognitive systems. 
We emphasize that in the case of conventional digital computation the driving force 
behind the computational process is instructional information. However, natural 
cognitive systems also process semantic contents that are descriptive and contingently 
either true or false. Human cognitive agents experience and inhabit the world as a 
semantic reality and interact informationally with their environments and other agents 
through their bodily interfaces (Floridi forthcoming). Whether our actions are guided 
by knowledge (where the underlying data are truthful) or just beliefs (where the 
underlying data may be false), the information in question is descriptive rather than 
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prescriptive. The IIP account does not preclude the possibility that the processed D be 
descriptive information. 
It is our contention that the IIP account is adequate for the explanation of digital 
computation. First, it is compatible with the common intuition that digital 
computation is a type of information processing. Second, unlike accounts that reduce 
digital computation to symbolic computation and exclude paradigmatic computational 
systems, the IIP account has the right scope. Moreover, it applies equally well to 
abstract systems, such as TMs and FSAs, and physical systems, such as flip-flops, 
ALUs and conventional digital computers. Third, whilst the IIP account classifies any 
system that executes a program (in the sense used in computer science) as 
computational, it is not restricted to this type of computational systems. 
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